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Abstract We extend the Abrams–Strogatz model for competition between two languages
(Abrams and Strogatz in Nature 424:900, 2003) to the case of n (≥ 2) competing states (i.e.,
languages). Although the Abrams–Strogatz model for n = 2 can be interpreted as modeling
either majority preference or minority aversion, the two mechanisms are distinct when n ≥ 3.
We find that the condition for the coexistence of different states is independent of n under
the pure majority preference, whereas it depends on n under the pure minority aversion.
We also show that the stable coexistence equilibrium and stable monopoly equilibria can be
multistable under the minority aversion and not under the majority preference. Furthermore,
we obtain the phase diagram of the model when the effects of the majority preference and
minority aversion are mixed, under the condition that different states have the same attrac-
tiveness. We show that the multistability is a generic property of the model facilitated by
large n.
Keywords Consensus · Majority rule · Population dynamics · Social dynamics
1 Introduction
The consensus problem, in which we ask whether the unanimity of one among different
competing states (e.g., opinions) is reached, and its mechanisms are of interest in various
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disciplines including political science, sociology, and statistical physics. In models of con-
sensus formation, it is usually assumed that each individual possesses one of the different
states that can flip over time. The flip rate depends on the environment such as the number of
the individuals that adopt a different state. Statistical physicists have approached this prob-
lem by analyzing a variety of models including the voter model, majority rule models, the
bounded confidence model, Axelrod’s model, and the naming game (see [3] for a review).
A major mechanism that would lead to consensus in a population is preference for the
majority. Collective opinion formation under various majority voting rules has been exam-
ined for mean-field populations [8, 11–13, 15, 19, 26] and in different types of networks such
as regular lattices [7–9, 22, 31], small-world networks [21], heterogeneous networks [17],
and networks with community structure [16, 18]. The majority preference may be identified
with the aversion to the minority. When there are only two states, they are equivalent be-
cause one state is the majority if and only if the other state is the minority. However, the two
principles may be distinct when more than two states are assumed [34]. We are concerned
with this case in the present study.
Language competition is an example of consensus problems. The model proposed by
Abrams and Strogatz (AS model) accounts for extinction of endangered languages [1]. The
AS model implements competition between two languages for speakers in a population. The
dynamics of the model is based on the majority preference, which is also regarded as the
minority aversion because there are just two competing languages.
Several authors found that different languages can stably coexist in variants of the AS
model. Two languages can coexist by spatial segregation in a model in which competi-
tion dynamics and spatial diffusion are combined [28, 29]. A Lotka–Volterra variant of the
AS model also leads to coexistence [30]. Introduction of bilingual individuals also enables
coexistence [24, 25]. Castelló and colleagues investigated variants of the AS model with
bilingualism on various networks [4, 5, 32, 33]. Coexistence also occurs when the attrac-
tiveness of languages is dynamically manipulated [6] or when bilingualism, horizontal (i.e.,
from adults to adults) and vertical (i.e., from adults to children) transmission of languages,
and dynamics of the languages’ attractiveness are combined [23, 35].
In the present work, we extend the AS model to the case of competition among a general
number of languages, denoted by n. Our model is a mean-field model (i.e., without spatial
or network structure), as is the original AS model. Because the AS model has been used
for modeling competition of other cultural or social traits such as religion [2], opinion, and
service sectors [20], we use the term “state” instead of “language” in the following. We show
that the behavior of the model is essentially different between n = 2 and n ≥ 3. In particular,
the coexistence of different states and the consensus can be multistable, i.e., the coexistence
and consensus equilibria are both stable, only when n ≥ 3.
2 Model
We extend the AS model to the case of competition among n (≥ 2) states. The dynamics of










where xi is the fraction of state i in the population, and Pji represents the transition rate from
state j to state i. Equation (1) respects the conservation law ∑ni=1 xi = 1. The transition rates
of the original AS model (i.e., n = 2) are given by
Pji = csixai = csi(1 − xj )a
(
(i, j) = (1,2), (2,1)), (2)
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where a > 0 controls the strength of the frequency-dependent state transition, si > 0 is the
attractiveness of state i, and
∑n
i=1 si = 1 [1]. Because c simply specifies the time scale of
the dynamics, we set c = 1.
Equation (2) allows two interpretations: majority preference because Pji = sixai and mi-
nority aversion because Pji = si(1 − xj )a . The two principles lead to the same model when
n = 2. However, the two principles are distinct when n ≥ 3. Therefore, we redefine Pji to
allow for independent manipulation of the two factors. The transition rates of the extended
model are defined by
Pji = sixβi (1 − xj )a−β, (3)
where β (≥ 0) and a −β (≥ 0) represent the strength of the majority preference and the mi-
nority aversion, respectively. When n = 2, the dynamics given by the substitution of Eq. (3)
in Eq. (1) becomes independent of the β value.
3 Analysis
3.1 Case of Majority Preference (i.e., β = a)
In this section, we set β = a to analyze the case in which the majority preference is present



















where 〈·〉 represents the average over the population, i.e., the average of a state-dependent
variable with weight xi (1 ≤ i ≤ n). Equation (4) is a replicator equation [14] in which sixa−1i
and 〈sxa−1〉 = ∑n=1 sxa play the role of the fitness for state i and the average fitness in the
population, respectively. The dynamics given by Eq. (4) has n trivial equilibria correspond-












(1 ≤ i ≤ n). (5)
V (x) ≡ −〈sxa−1〉, where x = (x1, . . . , xn), is a Lyapunov function of the dynamics given
























= −a(〈(sxa−1)2〉 − 〈sxa−1〉2) ≤ 0. (6)
V has a unique global extremum at x∗, which is minimum for a < 1 and maximum for a > 1
(Appendix A). Therefore, the coexistence equilibrium given by Eq. (5) is globally stable for
a < 1 and unstable for a > 1.
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Fig. 1 Dynamics of the
extended AS model when the
majority preference is present
and the minority aversion is
absent. We set n = 3, β = a,
s1 = 0.40, s2 = 0.35, and
s3 = 0.25. (a) a = 0.5 and
(b) a = 1.4. Solid and open
circles represent stable and
unstable equilibria, respectively
Fig. 2 Bifurcation diagram for
the extended AS model when the
majority preference is present
and the minority aversion is
absent. The parameter values are
equal to those used in Fig. 1
except that we vary a
Equation (4) also admits a unique equilibrium for each subset of the n states. When
n = 3, for example, the equilibrium in which states 1 and 2, but not 3, coexist is given












equilibria containing n′ states. If 2 ≤ n′ ≤ n − 1, these equilibria are
unstable. For a < 1, the instability immediately follows from the fact that x∗ is the unique
global minimum of V (x). For a > 1, any equilibrium containing n′ (2 ≤ n′ ≤ n − 1) states
is unstable because it realizes the global maximum of the same Lyapunov function restricted
to the simplex spanned by the n′ states.
When a = 1, we obtain V (x) ≡ −〈s〉 = ∑ni=1 sixi . Therefore, if si > sj (j = i), the
consensus of state i is eventually reached. If si = si′ > sj (j = i, i ′), for example, the n − 2
states corresponding to sj (j = i, i ′) are eventually eliminated. The dynamics then stops
such that states i and i ′ coexist. If all the three si values are equal, any population is neutrally
stable.
Figure 1 represents the dynamics in the two regimes with n = 3, which we obtained by
numerically integrating Eq. (4). For a < 1, a trajectory starting from anywhere in the interior
of the phase space, i.e., x that satisfies x1 + x2 + x3 = 1, x1, x2, x3 > 0, asymptotically
approaches the coexistence equilibrium (Fig. 1a). It should be noted that a point in the
triangle in Fig. 1a corresponds to a configuration of the population, i.e., x. For example,
corner ei (i = 1, 2, or 3) represents the consensus (i.e., xi = 1 and xj = 0 (j = i)), and the
normalized Euclidean distance from the point to the edge e2–e3 of the triangle is equal to
the x1 value. For a > 1, a trajectory starting from the interior of the triangle converges to
one of the n consensus equilibria, depending on the initial condition (Fig. 1b).
In Fig. 2, a bifurcation diagram in which we plot x∗1 against a is shown for s1 = 0.40,
s2 = 0.35, and s3 = 0.25. As a approaches unity from below, the stable coexistence equi-
librium approaches the unstable consensus equilibrium corresponding to the largest si value
(e1 in Fig. 1). At a = 1, the two equilibria collide, and an unstable coexistence equilibrium
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simultaneously bifurcates from the consensus equilibrium corresponding to the smallest si
value (e3 in Fig. 1).
3.2 Case of Minority Aversion (i.e., β = 0)
In this section, we set β = 0 to analyze the case in which the majority preference is absent






xj (1 − xj )a − (1 − xi)axi
= si
〈
(1 − x)a 〉 − (1 − xi)axi . (7)
In contrast to the case of the majority preference (Sect. 3.1), the simplex spanned by n′
(2 ≤ n′ ≤ n − 1) states is not invariant under the dynamics given by Eq. (7). Therefore, a
state that once gets extinct may reappear. In this section, we numerically analyze Eq. (7)
for n = 3 and n = 4. For general n, we analytically examine the special case in which si is
independent of i in Sect. 3.3.
For n = 3, the dynamics for various values of a is shown in Fig. 3. We set s1 = 0.36,
s2 = 0.33, and s3 = 0.31. When a is small (a < 1), there is a unique globally stable coex-
istence equilibrium in the interior (Fig. 3a). The three consensus equilibria e1, e2, and e3
are unstable. At a = 1, e1, e2, and e3 change the stability such that they are stable beyond
a = 1 (Appendix B). Simultaneously, a saddle point bifurcates from each consensus equi-
librium. The bifurcation occurs simultaneously for the three equilibria at a = 1 irrespective
of the values of s1, s2, and s3. Slightly beyond a = 1, the three consensus equilibria and
the interior coexistence equilibrium are multistable (see Fig. 3b for the results at a = 1.3).
As a increases, the attractive basin of the coexistence equilibrium becomes small, and that
of each consensus equilibrium becomes large (see Fig. 3c for the results at a = 1.4). At
a = ac1 ≈ 1.43, the coexistence equilibrium that is stable for a < ac1 and the unstable inte-
rior equilibrium that bifurcates from ei at a = 1, where i corresponds to the largest si value
(i = 1 in the present example), collide. This is a saddle-node bifurcation.
Numerically obtained ac1 values are shown in Fig. 4a for different values of s1, s2, and s3.
A point in the triangle in the figure specifies the values of s1, s2, and s3 under the constraint
s1 + s2 + s3 = 1, si > 0 (1 ≤ i ≤ 3). It seems that ac1 is the largest when si = 1/3 (1 ≤ i ≤ 3).
Figure 4 suggests that heterogeneity in si makes ac1 smaller and hence makes the stable
coexistence of the three states difficult. When si ≈ 1 and sj ≈ 0 (j = i), we obtain ac1 ≈ 1.
When a is slightly larger than ac1, there are two saddle points in the interior. In this
situation, one of the three consensus equilibria, which depends on the initial condition, is
eventually reached (Fig. 3d). However, the manner with which the triangular phase space is
divided into the three attractive basins is qualitatively different from that in the case of the
majority preference (Fig. 1b). In particular, in the present case of the minority aversion, even
if x1 is initially equal to 0, the consensus of state 1 (i.e., e1) can be reached. This behavior
never occurs in the case of the majority preference and less likely for a larger a value in the
case of the minority aversion (Fig. 3e).
The sizes of the attractive basins of the different equilibria are plotted against a in Fig. 5a.
Up to our numerical efforts with various initial conditions, we did not find limit cycles.
A discrete jump in the basin size of the coexistence equilibrium is observed at ac1 ≈ 1.43,
reminiscent of the saddle-node bifurcation. Interestingly, the attractive basin of the consen-
sus equilibrium e1 is the largest just beyond ac1.
As a increases further, the second saddle-node bifurcation occurs at a = ac2 ≈ 2.81,
where an unstable node and a saddle point coappear (Fig. 3f). Logically, the sizes of the
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Fig. 3 Dynamics of the
extended AS model when the
majority preference is absent and
the minority aversion is present.
We set n = 3, β = 0, s1 = 0.36,
s2 = 0.33, and s3 = 0.31.
(a) a = 0.9, (b) a = 1.3,
(c) a = 1.4, (d) a = 1.5,
(e) a = 2.6, (f) a = 2.9, and
(g) a = 10.0
attractive basins could be discontinuous at a = ac2 because some initial conditions with
small x1 might be attracted to e1 when a is slightly smaller than ac2 and to e2 or e3 when
a is slightly larger than ac2. However, up to our numerical efforts, we did not observe the
discontinuity, as implied by Fig. 5a.
Numerically obtained ac2 values are shown in Fig. 4b for different values of s1, s2, and s3.
Heterogeneity in si makes ac2 larger. In addition, ac2 is equal to ac1 when s1 = s2 = s3 = 1/3.
In this symmetric case, the three saddle points simultaneously collide with the stable star
node at a = 1. Beyond a = 1, the equilibrium that is the stable star node when a < 1 loses
its stability to become an unstable star node. The three saddle points move away from the
unstable star node as a increases. This transition can be interpreted as three simultaneously
occurring transcritical bifurcations.
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Fig. 4 Dependence of (a) ac1
and (b) ac2 on s1, s2, and s3
when the majority preference is
absent and the minority aversion
is present. A point in the triangle
corresponds to a triplet (s1, s2,
s3), where s1 + s2 + s3 = 1 and
si ≥ 0 (1 ≤ i ≤ 3)
The unstable node that emerges at a = ac2 approaches x∗i = 1/3 (1 ≤ i ≤ 3) in the
limit a → ∞, as shown in Appendix C. The three saddle points approach (x1, x2, x3) =
(1/2,1/2,0), (1/2,0,1/2), and (0,1/2,1/2), as shown in Fig. 3g. This is a trivial conse-
quence of the proof given in Appendix C. Therefore, the heterogeneity in si does not play
the role in the limit a → ∞ such that the phase space is symmetrically divided into the three
attractive basins corresponding to e1, e2, and e3.
For n = 4, the relationship between a and the sizes of the attractive basins of the different
equilibria is shown in Fig. 5b. The results are qualitatively the same as those for n = 3
(Fig. 5a).
3.3 Symmetric Case
In the previous sections, we separately considered the effect of the majority preference
(Sect. 3.1) and the minority aversion (Sect. 3.2). In this section, we examine the extended
AS model when both effects can be combined. To gain analytical insight into the model, we
focus on the symmetric case si = s (1 ≤ i ≤ n). Although normalization ∑ni=1 si = 1 leads
to si = 1/n, we set s = 1 in this section to simplify the notation; s just controls the time












Equation (8) implies that, regardless of the parameter values, there exist n trivial con-
sensus equilibria and symmetric coexistence equilibria of n′ (2 ≤ n′ ≤ n) states given by
x∗i = 1/n′, where i varies over the n′ surviving states arbitrarily selected from the n states.
Owing to the conservation law
∑n
i=1 xi = 1, the dynamics are (n − 1)-dimensional. The
eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix of the dynamics at the coexistence equilibrium containing




)a−β−1[(n−2)β +a −n+1], as shown
in Appendix D. Therefore, the coexistence equilibrium is stable if and only if
(n − 2)β + a − n + 1 < 0. (9)
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Fig. 5 Sizes of the attractive basins for different equilibria when the majority preference is absent and
the minority aversion is present. The lines with legend “State i” represent the basin size for the consen-
sus equilibrium of state i. The lines with legend “Coexistence” represent the basin size for the coexis-
tence equilibrium. (a) n = 3, β = 0, s1 = 0.36, s2 = 0.33, and s3 = 0.31. (b) n = 4, β = 0, s1 = 0.28,
s2 = 0.26, s3 = 0.24, and s4 = 0.22. We obtain ac1 ≈ 1.43 and ac2 ≈ 2.81 in (a) and ac1 ≈ 1.91 and
ac2 ≈ 3.29 in (b). We calculate the sizes of the attractive basins as follows. First, we take the ini-
tial condition (x1, x2, x3) = (0.01i,0.01j,0.01k), where i, j, k ≥ 1, i + j + k = 100, for n = 3 and
(x1, x2, x3, x4) = (0.05i,0.05j,0.05k,0.05), where i, j, k,  ≥ 1, i + j + k +  = 20, for n = 4. Second, we
run the dynamics starting from each initial condition until the trajectory converges. Third, we count fraction
of the initial conditions that converge to each stable equilibrium
Similarly, we show in Appendix B that the consensus equilibria are stable if and only if
a > 1. (10)
Coexistence equilibria of n′ (2 ≤ n′ ≤ n − 1) states are always unstable (Appendix D).
Figure 6 is the phase diagram of the model in which the stable equilibria for given param-
eter values are indicated. The thin solid and dashed lines separating two phases are given by
Eqs. (9) and (10), respectively. A multistable parameter region exists when n ≥ 3; Eq. (9) is
reduced to a < 1 when n = 2. When n ≥ 3, the multistability occurs except in the case of
the pure majority preference (i.e., β = a). The multistable parameter region enlarges as n
increases.
4 Discussion
We analyzed an extended AS model with n states. We showed that the introduction of the
minority aversion as compared to the majority preference changes the behavior of the model
with n ≥ 3 in two main aspects. First, different states stably coexist up to a larger a value
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Fig. 6 Phase diagram of the
extended AS model when all the
si values are equal. The thin solid
lines and the thin dashed line are
given by Eqs. (9) and (10),
respectively
with the minority aversion than with the majority preference. Nevertheless, it should be
noted that a is the exponent associated with different quantities in the two cases (Eq. (3)).
Second, the multistability of the consensus equilibria and the coexistence equilibrium is
facilitated by the minority aversion and opposed by the majority preference. We verified
that the main results also hold true in the case of more general transition rates than Eq. (3),
expressed as Pji = sγi (1 − sj )1−γ xβi (1 − xj )a−β (Appendix E).
Volovik and colleagues examined mean-field dynamics of a three-state opinion formation
model with minority aversion [34]. Coexistence of at least two states occurs in their model
even if a random choice term, equivalent to diffusive coupling, which the authors assumed, is
turned off. This is because only the most minor state decreases in the number of individuals
and the other two major states are equally strong in their model. In our model, the most
major and second major states have different strengths in attracting individuals, and the
coexistence equilibrium is stable only for small a.
Fu and Wang considered the combined effects of the majority preference and minority
avoidance on coevolution of opinions and network structure [10]. They assumed that the ma-
jority preference is used for collective opinion formation and the minority avoidance guides
network formation. They showed that segregated groups, each composed of individuals with
the same opinion, evolve when the minority avoidance is dominantly used. The coexistence
of multiple states owing to the segregation has also been shown in spatially extended AS
models [28, 29]. We showed that coexistence of different states is facilitated by the mi-
nority aversion, not by the majority preference, and that stable coexistence occurs without
segregation, or other spatial or network mechanisms.
Nowak and colleagues analyzed a replicator–mutator equation as a model of language
evolution [27]. They showed that coexistence of different grammars (i.e., states in our ter-
minology) and a consensus-like configuration in which one grammar dominates the others
are multistable when a learning parameter takes an intermediate value. If the learning is ac-
curate, the consensus-like configuration becomes monostable. Our model and theirs differ
in at least two aspects. First, the control parameter in our model is a, that is, the strength
of the sum of the majority preference and minority aversion. Second, the stable coexistence
in our model requires some minority aversion, whereas their model takes into account the
majority preference but not the minority aversion.
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Appendix A: Unimodality of the Lyapunov function
We denote the Hessian of V (x) by H(V ), which is an (n− 1)× (n− 1) matrix owing to the
conservation law
∑n
i=1 xi = 1. We obtain





a(1 − a)(sixa−2i + snxa−2n ) (1 ≤ i = j ≤ n − 1),
a(1 − a)snxa−2n (1 ≤ i = j ≤ n − 1),
(11)
where xn = 1 − ∑n−1i=1 xi and sn = 1 −
∑n−1
i=1 si . For any x, H(V ) is positive (negative)









a(1 − a)snxa−2n yiyj














≷ 0 (a ≶ 1), (12)
for any (n − 1)-dimensional nonzero vector y. Therefore, V (x) is strictly convex (concave)
for a < 1 (a > 1) and hence has a unique global extremum at x∗, which realizes the mini-
mum (maximum) of V (x).
Appendix B: Eigenvalues of the Jacobian Matrix in the Consensus Equilibria
On the basis of Eqs. (1) and (3), the (n − 1) × (n − 1) Jacobian matrix (Jij ) = (∂x˙i/∂xj )







kji − lin −
n∑
j=1, j =i







(lij − lin − kij + kin) (i = j), (14)
where
kji ≡ βsixβ−1i xj (1 − xj )a−β, (15)
lj i ≡ sj (1 − xi)a−β−1
[
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and




By exploiting symmetry, we examine the Jacobian matrix at the consensus equilibrium
given by xi = 0 (1 ≤ i ≤ n − 1) and xn = 1. In this case, Eqs. (13) and (14) are reduced to
Jii = asi lim
xi→0
xa−1i − sn (18)
and
Jij = 0, (19)
respectively. Therefore, irrespective of the value of β , the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix,
denoted by λi (1 ≤ i ≤ n − 1), are given by
λi = Jii =
{−sn (a > 1),
si − sn (a = 1),
+∞ (a < 1).
(20)
Appendix C: Coexistence Equilibrium when a → ∞
For general n, Eq. (7) implies that
(1 − xi)axi
si
= 〈(1 − x)a 〉 (1 ≤ i ≤ n) (21)
is satisfied at the equilibrium. In particular, we obtain
(1 − x∗i )ax∗i
si





(i = j). (22)







































The coexistence implies that x∗i and x∗j do not tend to 0 as a → ∞. Therefore, Eq. (24) leads
to x∗i = x∗j in the limit a → ∞. Therefore, x∗i = 1/n (1 ≤ i ≤ n).
Appendix D: Eigenvalues of the Jacobian Matrix in the Coexistence Equilibria in the
Symmetric Case
On the basis of Eq. (8), the (n−1)×(n−1) Jacobian matrix (Jij ) = (∂x˙i/∂xj ) is represented
by Eqs. (13)–(17) with si = 1 (1 ≤ i ≤ n). At the coexistence equilibrium given by x∗i = 1/n
(1 ≤ i ≤ n), Eqs. (13) and (14) are reduced to








(n − 2)β + a − n + 1] (25)
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and
Jij = 0, (26)
respectively. Therefore, the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix are (n − 1)-fold degenerate
and given by








(n − 2)β + a − n + 1] (1 ≤ i ≤ n − 1). (27)
By exploiting symmetry, we consider the coexistence equilibrium of n′ states given by
x∗i = 0 (1 ≤ i ≤ n − n′) and x∗i = 1/n′ (n − n′ + 1 ≤ i ≤ n). In this case, Eqs. (13) and (14)





















a−β−1[(n′ − 2)β + a − n′ + 1] (n − n′ + 1 ≤ i ≤ n − 1
+ ( 1
n′ )
β − β 1
n′ (1 − 1n′ )a−β limxj →0 xβ−1j and 1 ≤ j ≤ n − n′),
0 (otherwise).
(29)
The eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix are the diagonal entries because the Jacobian matrix
is a triangular matrix. Therefore, we obtain






β−1 (β > 1),
(1 − 1
n′ )
a−1 − 1 (β = 1),
+∞ (β < 1),
(30)
for 1 ≤ i ≤ n − n′ and








n′ − 2)β + a − n′ + 1] (31)
for n − n′ + 1 ≤ i ≤ n − 1. Equations (30) and (31) imply that at least one eigenvalue is
positive unless a = β = 1. When a = β = 1, all the eigenvalues are equal to zero.
Appendix E: Analysis of a Generalized Model
Consider a variant of the extended AS model in which the transition rate given by Eq. (3) is
replaced by
Pji = sγi (1 − sj )1−γ xβi (1 − xj )a−β, (32)
where 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1. Equation (3) is reproduced with γ = 1. Here, the exponents γ and 1 − γ
represent the strength of the preference for a strong state and the aversion to a weak state,
respectively.
In the case of the majority preference (i.e., β = a), Eq. (1) with the transition rates given
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There also exists a unique equilibrium composed of arbitrarily chosen n′ states (2 ≤ n′ ≤
n − 1). The Lyapunov function is given by
V (x) = − 〈s
γ xa−1〉
〈(1 − s)1−γ 〉a . (34)
































= a(〈(sγ xa−1)2〉〈(1 − s)1−γ 〉 − 〈sγ xa−1(1 − s)1−γ 〉〈sγ xa−1〉) (35)
and






























〈(1 − s)1−γ 〉a +
a〈sγ xa−1〉 d
dt
〈(1 − s)1−γ 〉
〈(1 − s)1−γ 〉a+1
= −a(〈A
2〉〈B〉2 − 2〈AB〉〈A〉〈B〉 + 〈A〉2〈B2〉)
〈B〉a+1
= −a〈(A〈B〉 − 〈A〉B)
2〉
〈B〉a+1 ≤ 0, (37)
where A ≡ sγ xa−1 and B ≡ (1 − s)1−γ .
We have no proof of the unimodality of V (x). However, we numerically verified the
unimodality for n = 3. These results are the same as those obtained in the main text for
γ = 1 (Sect. 3.1).
For any β , the Jacobian matrix (Jij ) = (∂x˙i/∂xj ) is given by Eqs. (13) and (14), where
kji ≡ βsγi (1 − sj )1−γ xβ−1i xj (1 − xj )a−β, (38)
lj i ≡ sγi (1 − sj )1−γ (1 − xj )a−β−1
[










In the consensus equilibrium given by xi = 0 (1 ≤ i ≤ n− 1) and xn = 1, Eqs. (13) and (14)
are reduced to
Jii = asγi (1 − sn)1−γ lim
xi→0
xa−1i − sγn (1 − si)1−γ (41)
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Fig. 7 Sizes of the attractive
basins for different equilibria
when the majority preference is
absent and the minority aversion
is present in a generalized model.
We set (a) γ = 0 and (b) γ = 0.5.
We also set n = 3, β = 0,
s1 = 0.36, s2 = 0.33, and
s3 = 0.31, the same parameter
values as those used for Fig. 5a.
We obtain ac1 ≈ 1.57 and
ac2 ≈ 2.56 in (a) and ac1 ≈ 1.50
and ac2 ≈ 2.69 in (b). The
procedure for calculating the
basin size is described in the
caption of Fig. 5
and
Jij = 0, (42)
respectively. Therefore, the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix are given by




−sγn (1 − si)1−γ (a > 1),
s
γ
i (1 − sn)1−γ − sγn (1 − si)1−γ (a = 1),
+∞ (a < 1),
(43)
and the consensus equilibrium is stable if a > 1.
In the case of the minority aversion (i.e., β = 0), when n = 3, the sizes of the attrac-
tive basins for different equilibria for γ = 0 and γ = 0.5 are shown in Figs. 7a and 7b,
respectively. The results are qualitatively the same as those for γ = 1 (Fig. 5a).
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